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I. Introduction
In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson called on Congress to
enact new legislation to combat organized crime and
racketeering—a “national industry” which had become a “cancer in
the city.” 1 In 1970, Congress responded to the President’s call to
action. 2 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) provided prosecutors with powerful new tools to deal with
organized crime and the Mafia. 3 Through RICO, Congress created
new criminal penalties and civil actions against individuals
engaging in certain criminal activities related to an enterprise.4
Although the legislation was initially designed to prevent the
infiltration of legitimate businesses, 5 the Supreme Court
eventually ruled that RICO also prohibited the operation of
organizations solely engaged in criminal conduct. 6 Today, the
1. 111 CONG. REC. S4277 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1965) (message from President
Johnson).
2. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2018)) (“It is the purpose of this
Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process . . . to deal with
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.”); Nixon Signs Bill to
Combat Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 1970), https://perma.cc/H7PY-44N3 (last
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“The new law, Mr. Nixon said, will give the Federal
Government the means ‘to launch a total war against organized crime, and we
will end this war.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961–1968 (2018) (prohibiting infiltration of an enterprise with funds obtained
through racketeering activities and engaging in racketeering activities through
an enterprise).
4. See id. §§ 1963–1964 (providing penalties and remedies including
imprisonment of twenty years to life, forfeiture of assets, and triple damages).
5. See S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76–77 (1969) (outlining how racketeers
infiltrate business ranging from bowling alleys to stock exchanges).
6. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–81 (1981) (“On its face,
the definition [of enterprise] appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises within its scope; it no more excludes criminal enterprises than it does

REINVESTING IN RICO

511

statute addresses two primary concerns: (1) the infiltration or
control of an enterprise by criminals and (2) the operation of an
enterprise for a criminal purpose. 7 In his seminal article RICO:
The Crime of Being a Criminal, Columbia Law professor and
Senior Circuit Court Judge Gerald Lynch referred to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a) and (b) as the “infiltration” subsections designed to
prevent criminals from infiltrating legitimate businesses and
characterized § 1962(c) as the “criminally operated” enterprise
subsection which concerned participation in an enterprise through
criminal activities. 8
Since the law’s passage, “infiltration” cases have fallen to the
wayside, 9 with “operation” cases being the primary vehicle for the
statute’s use. 10 In 1987, Judge Lynch asserted that the infiltration
subsections were essentially “dead letters as prosecuting tools.”11
Instead, prosecutors have primarily used the “operation”
subsection to go after mob bosses, Ponzi-schemers and gang
members, 12 and their focus has expanded beyond mobsters to

legitimate ones.”).
7. H. LOWELL BROWN & WES R. PORTER, WHITE COLLAR CRIME : RICO § 1:4
(2019) (“Liability under RICO arises from either: (1) investing or acquiring an
interest in; or (2) controlling; or (3) conducting the affairs of an enterprise through
a pattern of racketeering activity.”).
8. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I &
II, 87 COLUM . L. REV . 661, 731–32 (1987) (categorizing different types of
prosecutions brought under § 1962).
9. See DAVID B. S MITH & TERRANCE G. REED, CIVIL RICO § 5.02 (2019)
(“[S]ection 1962(a) attracted little notice from prosecutors.”).
10. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 726–31 (providing an overview of RICO
prosecutions since the statute’s enactment and discussing the decrease in use of
the infiltration subsections); see also S MITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 5.02 n.4
(“In fact there does not seem to be a single case in which a real organized crime
figure has been prosecuted under § 1962(a).”).
11. Lynch, supra note 8, at 726.
12. See id. at 726–27 (“Of the 236 RICO indictments included in the study,
only 17 (fewer than eight percent) appear to have included counts charging
violations of [the infiltration] sections, or conspiracies to violate them.”); Nathan
Koppel, They Call It RICO, and It Is Sweeping, WALL S T. J.,
https://perma.cc/MC8G-RR3P (last updated Jan. 20, 2011, 5:14 PM) (last visited
Nov. 5, 2019) (“Prosecutors have used RICO to pursue some of the highest-profile
organized-crime families, including the Gambinos and Genoveses . . . .”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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sometimes include corporate executives. 13 Civil litigants have
turned RICO into a tool to take business disputes to federal court
with hopes of earning triple damages out of arguably lesser cases.14
The expansive use of RICO is subject to criticism, with some
scholars arguing that prosecutors and litigants have stretched the
act’s language too far. 15 In response to early criticism, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) established guidelines regarding the
use of RICO 16 and Congress limited its applicability in the civil
context. 17
Now almost fifty years after RICO’s passage, criminals are
turning to the internet and cryptocurrencies to establish a new
frontier for organized crime. 18 RICO’s application to
cryptocurrencies is the subject of this Note. Cryptocurrencies are
digital money—virtual assets intended to serve as an alternative
to traditional money using a decentralized system and
cryptography to track transactions and prevent fraud.19
13. See Peter J. Henning, RICO Charge in Pharmaceutical Case May Signal
Tougher Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/H3N4-KV 2R (last
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (detailing RICO charges against pharmaceutical executives
allegedly employing a kickback scheme with doctors) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
14. See Peter J. Henning, RICO Lawsuits Are Tempting, but Tread Lightly,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/ZP4P-KBCJ (last visited Nov. 5,
2019) (“RICO lawsuits are tempting. They allow a plaintiff to sue . . . and seek an
award of triple damages, a bonanza in some business disputes that can run into
millions of dollars.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 726–63 (discussing federal prosecutors’
expansive use of RICO); Craig M. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts:
An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV . 837, 838 (1980) (suggesting that RICO is
overly broad and courts should engage in a narrow judicial construction of the
statute).
16. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , JUSTICE M ANUAL § 9-110.200 (“[I]t is the policy
of the Criminal Division that RICO be selectively and uniformly used.”).
17. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67
§ 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (1995) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2018)) (amending
RICO to prevent civil actions for securities fraud under RICO unless the
individual is first criminally convicted of the fraud).
18. See, e.g., YAYA J. FANUSIE & TOM ROBINSON, FOUND. FOR DEF. OF
DEMOCRACIES, CTR. ON S ANCTIONS & ILLICIT FIN., BITCOIN LAUNDERING: AN
ANALYSIS OF ILLICIT FLOWS INTO DIGITAL CURRENCY S ERVICES (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://perma.cc/3SF5-JKWB (PDF) (“Criminals—often early adopters of new
technologies—quickly appreciated that Bitcoin has unique properties that could
potentially serve their interest in evading law enforcement.”).
19. See
Cryptocurrency,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Nov.
3,
2019),
https://perma.cc/4XZP-JJZU (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“A cryptocurrency is a
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Cryptocurrencies and the underlying blockchain technology serve
plenty of legitimate uses including online shopping and
instantaneous peer-to-peer payments. 20 Despite these legitimate
uses, cryptocurrencies have acquired an illicit reputation due to
their use by criminals. 21
Champions of cryptocurrencies often tout them as an
anonymous way to transfer funds free from oversight.22 This
promise of anonymity caused criminals to flock to
cryptocurrency.23 However, cryptocurrencies’ anonymous nature is
often overstated, with the truth being that cryptocurrencies are
generally pseudo-anonymous, obscuring personal information but
still allowing tracing of transactions and identification of users by
law enforcement officers. 24 Nevertheless, criminals continue to use
cryptocurrencies to mask their identities in modern digital twists

digital or virtual currency that is secured by cryptography, which makes it nearly
impossible to counterfeit or double-spend.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
20. See PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS FIN. S ERVS. INST., M ONEY IS NO OBJECT :
UNDERSTANDING
THE EVOLVING CRYPTOCURRENCY
M ARKET 8 (2015),
https://perma.cc/LP6J-ZRBR (PDF) (surveying consumers’ cryptocurrency usage).
21. See id. at 1 (“[N]ot all media coverage surrounding cryptocurrency has
been positive, with several high profile situations noting Bitcoin’s use in a variety
of illicit contexts.”).
22. See FERGAL REID & M ARTIN HARRIGAN, AN ANALYSIS OF ANONYMITY IN THE
BITCOIN S YSTEM 2 (2012), https://perma.cc/9GZJ-EEK4 (PDF) (discussing
Wikileaks’ solicitation of “anonymous” bitcoin donations).
23. See Corinne Ramey, The Crypto Crime Wave Is Here, WALL S T. J. (Apr.
26, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://perma.cc/R8QG-PKPA (“From stickups and drug
deals to white-collar scams, cryptocurrency-related crime is soaring—and law
enforcement is scrambling to keep up.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
24. See PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS , supra note 20, at 8 (“[A cryptocurrency]
transaction can be traced to the person/entity (if illegal activity is suspected)
using a combination of procedures that includes identifying the destination of the
transaction through the publically available transaction ledger.”).
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on classic organized crimes, including money laundering,25 drug
sales, 26 and extortion.27
In an early and infamous example of cryptocurrency crime,
Ross Ulbricht launched an illicit online drug marketplace known
as Silk Road that facilitated 1.2 million Bitcoin transactions worth
approximately $1.2 billion dollars. 28 More recently, hackers used
malware to seize control of hospital computers and required a
ransom in bitcoins before unlocking the computers.29 In late 2018,
kidnappers abducted Anne-Elisabeth Falkevik Hagen, wife of a
Norwegian utilities and real estate magnate, and left a note
requiring a nine million euros ransom be paid in cryptocurrency.30
Many of these crypto-crimes constitute predicate acts under

25. See Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Exchange Was Nexus of Crime, Indictment
Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/YP2A-GG9X (last visited Nov.
5, 2019) (detailing the arrest of Alexander V innik, who ran a Bitcoin exchange
that facilitated ransomware fraud, identity theft, drug trafficking, and public
corruption) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See Nathaniel Popper & Rebecca R. Ruiz, 2 Leading Online Black
Markets Are Shut Down by Authorities, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/G62U-URKK (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (reporting on the closure
of AlphaBay and Hansa Market, two large dark-net black markets which relied
on cryptocurrency) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. See Mark Scott & Nicole Perlroth, With Ransomware, It’s Pay and
Embolden Perpetrators, or Lose Precious Data, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017),
https://perma.cc/J4G3-KUAZ (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (outlining ransomware
attacks that affected more than two hundred thousand computers) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Thieves
Threaten Real Violence for Virtual Currencies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018),
https://perma.cc/H6UR-TLNG (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (reporting on bitcoin
owners forced to make an irreversible transfer to thieves through robbery and
extortion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. See Nate Anderson & Cyrus Farivar, How The Feds Took Down the
Dread Pirate Roberts, ARS TECHNICA (October 3, 2013, 12:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/38KR-S6CU (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (detailing the operation of
a drug trafficking online marketplace which relied on Bitcoin for its payment
system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See Samuel Gibbs, Wannacry: Hackers Withdraw £108,000 of Bitcoin
Ransom, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2017, 9:27 AM), https://perma.cc/Q3AC-K58X (last
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (reporting on the withdrawal of the successful ransom
payments) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
30. See Henrik Pryser Libell & Richard Martyn-Hemphill, Cryptocurrency
Ransom Demanded for Wife of Norwegian Tycoon, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://perma.cc/MP7W-DXPA (“[T]he police had advised Ms. Hagen’s husband,
Tom Hagen, not to pay.”).
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RICO, 31 enabling federal prosecutors and civil litigants to use
RICO if the crimes were undertaken as part of an enterprise or if
the perpetrator used the predicate crimes to infiltrate an
enterprise.32
At least two cases, one criminal and one civil, have attempted
prosecution of cryptocurrency criminals under RICO. In 2017, a
grand jury indicted Alexandre Cazes under RICO for his
leadership of a criminal enterprise overseeing a massive illegal
online marketplace, ten times larger than Silk Road. 33 However,
the prosecution ended after Cazes committed suicide. 34 In late
2018, Michael Terpin, a cryptocurrency investor, used RICO to sue
a hacker for illegally accessing his phone account and subsequently
stealing over twenty-three million dollars in cryptocurrency.35
Both of these cases used the operation subsection of the statute.
This Note argues that one of the infiltration subsections of
RICO may be better suited to cryptocurrency prosecutions.36
Subsection 1962(a) addresses the infiltration of an enterprise by
investing proceeds from racketeering activities and this Note
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2018) (defining “racketeering activity” with an
extensive list of state and federal crimes).
32. See id. § 1962 (providing that it is unlawful to: (a) invest income from
racketeering activities into an enterprise, (b) acquire or maintain an interest in
any enterprise through racketeering activities, (c) use racketeering activities
during the business of any enterprise, and (d) conspire to violate the substantive
provisions of RICO).
33. See Indictment at ¶¶ 21–23, United States v. Cazes, Case No.
1:17-CR-00144 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2017) (charging Cazes for his part in operating
AlphaBay, an enterprise engaged in racketeering activities); see also Thomas
Brewster, Forget Silk Road, Cops Just Scored Their Biggest Victory Against The
Dark
Web Drug
Trade,
FORBES
(July 20, 2017, 10:57 AM),
https://perma.cc/SRY9-ANRT (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“[A]s many as $2 million
in trades were being done over AlphaBay every week as of April [2017].”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34 . See Wassayos Ngamkham, Canadian Drug Suspect Found Hanged in
Cell, BANGKOK POST (July 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/AAV 5-PCDU (last visited
Nov. 5, 2019) (reporting that Cazes committed suicide while in Thai custody
awaiting extradition to the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
35. See Complaint at ¶¶ 33–45, Terpin v. Truglia, Case No. 18-ST-CV -09875
(Super. Ct. Cal. Dec. 28, 2018) (detailing an enterprise consisting of Truglia and
twenty-five unknown individuals).
36. See infra Part IV (regarding the uses of cryptocurrency networks as the
enterprise required by the statute).
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contends that a cryptocurrency network could serve as the
“enterprise” required by the statute. 37 Instead of having to
investigate and prove the relationships in an underlying criminal
enterprise, proponents of a RICO case against crypto-criminals
could rely on well-documented and publicly available information
about the cryptocurrency network to prove the enterprise and the
relationships among its members. 38 If accepted by courts,
prosecutors and plaintiffs could proceed under investing
subsection with assurances that the “enterprise” element of the
statute would be satisfied. 39 In addition to punishing criminals,
this proposed method would also benefit legitimate cryptocurrency
users by discouraging criminals from infiltrating legitimate
cryptocurrency businesses. 40
In order to provide some background, this Note will first
summarize the history of cryptocurrencies and RICO. 41 Next, this
Note will explore the elements of a RICO claim and the current
methods of prosecuting cryptocurrency criminals. 42 The discussion
will turn to how cryptocurrency networks could be used to satisfy
the enterprise element of the RICO statute. 43 This Note will then
examine some potential criticisms of cryptocurrencies as a RICO
enterprise.44 The discussion will conclude with some thoughts
regarding the prudence of cryptocurrency prosecutions under
RICO and what type of cryptocurrency cases should be prosecuted
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(b) (2018) (prohibiting investment of
racketeering proceeds in an enterprise); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“‘[E]nterprise’
includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity . . . .”).
38. See, e.g., Blockchain Explorer, BLOCKCHAIN LUXEMBOURG S.A.,
https://perma.cc/6RN9-L5WB (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (cataloging every Bitcoin
transaction in existence and the relationships between Bitcoin users) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) (concluding that
RICO prohibits both the infiltration of legitimate business and enterprises
created for solely criminal purposes).
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (regarding the investment or interest in an
enterprise through racketeering activities).
41. See infra Part II.
42. See infra Part III.
43. See infra Part IV .A.
44. See infra Part IV .B.
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under RICO. 45 In essence, this Note argues that prosecutors should
be able to demonstrate that a criminal using cryptocurrencies has
infiltrated an enterprise in violation of RICO, but should exercise
restraint unless the criminal is engaging in criminal activities on
the scale of traditional organized crime. 46
I. Summary of RICO and Cryptocurrencies
A. The History of RICO
Concerned with the mob’s wide-spread criminal activities,47
Congress drafted RICO to protect the public from the scourge of
organized crime. 48 To that end, the legislature imbued on
prosecutors a “general tool to bring any prosecution that the
Justice Department thinks is desirable but that does not fit under
any other heading.” 49 The use of RICO as a “general tool” depends
on two statutory sources: the expansive definition of enterprise50
and the wide range of criminal activities covered by the statute.51
In order to provide the broad powers required to prosecute
organized crime, the bill evolved beyond Congress’s initial purpose
45. See infra Part V (concluding that the success of a cryptocurrency
prosecution under the proposed method will likely depend on how much the
underlying situation reflects the original intention of Congress).
46. See infra Part IV (analyzing the enterprise requirement and the
Department of Justice guidelines regarding the use of RICO).
47. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 681–82 (discussing Senator McClellan’s
introduction of the bill and its subsequent revisions).
48. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2018)) (“It is the purpose of this
Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process . . . to deal with
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.”).
49. Lynch, supra note 8, at 724.
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2018) (defining enterprise as “any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity”); see also Lynch,
supra note 8, at 732 (discussing the requirement that an “enterprise” be a legal
association or association in fact).
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (listing the predicate acts eligible for RICO
prosecution).
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to prevent infiltration of legitimate organizations to include all
manners of criminal activities connected with an enterprise.52
Some courts initially attempted to limit RICO’s broad
application.53 However, the Supreme Court soon considered and
rejected these limitations on the definition of enterprise.
In United States v. Turkette, 54 the Court reviewed a RICO
prosecution of Novia Turkette, Jr. for his alleged leadership of a
criminal organization with no apparent legitimate purpose.55
Turkette argued—and the Court of Appeals agreed—that RICO
exclusively applied to the infiltration of legitimate enterprises and
excluded criminal organizations that performed only illegal acts.56
The Court dismissed the argument. 57
The Court considered two potential purposes of RICO and
§ 1962(c): to prevent infiltration of legitimate businesses by
criminal elements 58 and to allow prosecution of any criminals
engaging in an enterprise. 59 The Court first reviewed the
unambiguous language of the statute, observing that the statute
itself made no mention of legitimate or criminal concerns in
defining “enterprise.” 60 The Court then rejected the lower court’s
52. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 713 (“If RICO has evolved into something
different from what Congress intended at its creation, it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that Congress has looked at what has evolved, and pronounced it
good.”).
53. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899 (1st Cir. 1980) (“A
careful reading of sections 1961(4) and 1962(c) convinces us that they cannot be
used as tandem springboards to reach any individual or groups of individuals who
engage in a pattern of exclusively criminal racketeering activity.”).
54. See 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981) (providing that RICO covers both
infiltration of legitimate business and entirely criminal enterprises).
55. See id. at 579 (summarizing the RICO conspiracy charge against
Turkette for leading a criminal organization which trafficked narcotics,
committed arsons, defrauded insurance companies, bribed police, and corruptly
influenced state court proceedings).
56. See id. (noting that the Court of Appeals agreed with Turkette’s
characterization of the statute).
57. See id. (reversing the Court of Appeals decision).
58. See id. at 591 (“[T]he legislative history forcefully supports the view that
the major purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of legitimate business
by organized crime.”).
59. See id. at 581 (“Congress did nothing to indicate that an enterprise
consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the
enterprise was exclusively criminal.”).
60. See id. at 580–81 (“On its face, the definition appears to include both
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conclusion that a broad definition created internal inconsistencies
in the statute. 61 Confident that the language of the statute
supported the broad definition, the Court examined the legislative
history to support its conclusion.62 Congress’s declared purpose to
combat organized crime rendered the narrow definition untenable
because “[w]hole areas of organized criminal activity would be
placed beyond the substantive reach of the enactment . . . so long
as the association did not deviate from the criminal path.” 63
After
Turkette,
prosecutors—primarily limited by
prosecutorial discretion—used RICO’s newly broadened powers to
prosecute criminals engaging in enterprises. 64 With the broad
definition of enterprise, prosecutorial discretion under RICO goes
far beyond typical discretion and authorizes prosecutors to add on
a major federal criminal charge to comparatively minor predicate
crimes. 65 Criminal RICO prosecutions soon expanded from
traditional organized crime to include white collar crime.66
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its scope; it no more excludes
criminal enterprises than it does legitimate ones.”).
61. See id. at 587 (“Applying [RICO] also to criminal organizations does not
render any portion of the statute superfluous nor does it create any structural
incongruities within the framework of the Act.”).
62. See id. (“We are also quite sure that nothing in the legislative history of
RICO requires a contrary conclusion.”).
63. Id. at 589–90.
64. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III &
IV, 87 C OLUM . L. REV . 920, 921 (1987) (arguing that after Turkette, prosecutors
invoked RICO in cases resembling simple conspiracy); John Dombrink & James
W. Meeker, Racketeering Prosecution: The Use and Abuse of RICO, 16 RUTGERS
L.J. 633, 640–54 (1985) (concluding that criminal RICO was used in a
conservative manner during its first fourteen years); Jeff Atkinson, Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68: Broadest of the
Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1978) (“[Under RICO,
t]he only limits of federal domination of enforcement of these traditionally
state-prosecuted crimes are the limits of federal resources and prosecutorial
discretion.”).
65. See Russell D. Leblang, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion Under State
RICO, 24 S UFFOLK U. L. REV . 79, 88 (1990) (“The fact that the crime defined by
RICO is so far reaching, and that the disparity of scale between the sanctions
available under RICO and those under the predicates is so great, ‘suggests [that]
the prosecutor’s ability to unilaterally declare a crime major or minor has
dramatically increased.’”).
66. See G. Robert Blakey & John Robert Blakey, Civil and Criminal RICO:
An Overview of the Statute and Its Operation, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 36, 43 (1997)
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Without the difficulty of proving a legitimate enterprise,
prosecutors generally abandoned § 1962(a)’s prohibition of
investment of racketeering income and § 1962(b)’s proscription
against acquisition of control over an enterprise through a pattern
of racketeering activity. 67 Some commentators have argued that
the broad definition of “enterprise” grants prosecutors “unfettered
freedom to allege the ‘enterprise’ best suited to its needs in a
particular case.” 68 To address concerns about abuses, the DOJ
adopted strict guidelines regarding the use of RICO, 69 and the
worries about potential abuses have generally not come to
fruition. 70 Despite continuing criticisms, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its expansive interpretation of the enterprise element
in Boyle v. United States. 71 Boyle and Turkette are the two primary
cases regarding the enterprise element, 72 but the statute has
several other nuances worth exploring before discussing how the
statute might apply to a cryptocurrency network.
(“Roughly 39 percent have been in the organized crime area . . . , while 48 percent
have been in the white-collar crime area . . . [, and 13] percent fall into other
categories, such as violent groups, including terrorists, white-hate, and
anti-Semitic.”); see also Lucian E. Dervan & Ellen S. Podgor, “White-Collar
Crime”: Still Hazy After All These Years, 50 GA. L. REV . 709, 759–60 (2016)
(“Despite RICO’s initial focus on these traditional mafia organizations, only about
4% of the RICO cases decided by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits from 2002 to
2014 involved what might be considered traditional organized crime entities.”).
67. See Daniel Murner et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations, 55 AM . CRIM . L. REV . 1619, 1639–40 (2018) (“Relatively few
criminal indictments allege a violation of § 1962(a) . . . . Like § 1962(a), § 1962(b)
rarely forms the basis of a RICO action.” (citations omitted)).
68. S MITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 3.05.
69. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , JUSTICE M ANUAL § 9-110.200 (“Despite the
broad statutory language of RICO and the legislative intent that the
statute ‘. . . shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose,’ it is
the policy of the Criminal Division that RICO be selectively and uniformly used.”).
70. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 V A. L. REV .
879, 915 (2005) (“Although faith in prosecutorial discretion has arguably been
vindicated by extreme restraint in the use of criminal RICO, the course of action
pursued in Turkette was, to say the least, dangerous.”).
71. 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009) (“As we succinctly put it in Turkette, an
association-in-fact enterprise is ‘a group of persons associated together for a
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.’” (quoting United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981))).
72. See S MITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 3.02 (stating that Turkette resolved
the paramount issue of whether RICO encompassed illegitimate enterprises and
Boyle set the bounds of what constitutes an enterprise).
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B. The Elements of a RICO Case
RICO punishes a “person” for engaging in a “pattern of
racketeering activities” connected to an “enterprise” which affects
interstate or foreign commerce. 73 The “person,” the “pattern of
racketeering activities,” and the “enterprise” are typically the
litigated elements of a violation. 74 Congress intended for the law to
be liberally construed, 75 which influences courts towards broader
interpretations of the statute.76
The RICO “person” is the least litigated aspect of the statute.77
The statutory definition is not limited to natural persons but
rather includes “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal
or beneficial interest in property.”78 Courts have interpreted this
broad definition to include corporations, 79 unincorporated political
committees, 80 and decedents’ estates. 81 In interpreting the RICO
person, courts examine state law to see if the alleged person is
capable of holding property.82 Unsurprisingly, courts typically
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2018) (providing three ways to violate the statute
as well as a conspiracy charge).
74. See Blakey & Blakey, supra note 66, at 38 (summarizing the essential
elements of the statute).
75. See S MITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 3.01 (asserting that the Supreme
Court cut the heart out of the statute in Turkette, and then failed to rectify its
mistake in Boyle).
76. See generally Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of
Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV . L. REV . 1101, 1103–21 (1982) (cataloging judicial
restrictions on RICO).
77. See Blakey & Blakey, supra note 66, at 38 (“The two basic elements of
RICO that have given litigants the most trouble are ‘pattern’ and ‘enterprise.’”).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (2018).
79. See Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 226 (7th Cir. 1997)
(finding that Chrysler Corporation constituted a “person” under the statute).
80. See Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1282 (2d Cir. 1991)
(recognizing that New York law allowed an unincorporated political committee to
hold property).
81. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Caton’s Estate, 540 F. Supp. 673,
681–82 (N.D. Ind. 1982), overruled by Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 656 F. Supp.
950 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (finding that RICO liability survives the death of a
wrongdoer and approving recovery from his estate).
82. See, e.g., Jund, 941 F.2d at 1282 (rejecting an argument that
unincorporated entities could not hold property); State Farm, 540 F. Supp. at 682
(“A construction of RICO that permits full survival against the estate of an alleged
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limit the statute’s applicability to governments and government
agencies due to governmental immunity, even though they are
entities capable of holding property. 83
The next element, the “pattern of racketeering activities,”
includes a broad range of state and federal crimes—drug
trafficking, money laundering, murder, kidnapping, gambling,
bribery, extortion, and sexual exploitation of children, among
many others. 84 These offenses are commonly referred to as RICO
predicate acts. 85 A person engages in a pattern of racketeering
activities by committing two predicate acts within ten years of each
other. 86 Courts require a relationship between the predicate acts
and some continuity between the acts in order to prove the pattern
of racketeering activities.87 As an alternative to proving a pattern
of racketeering activities, a claimant may also prove that the
person collected an “unlawful debt”—a gambling debt forbidden
under state or federal usury laws. 88 But this alternative is rarely
used. 89
As discussed above, an “enterprise” is any legal entity or any
group of people “associated in fact although not a legal entity.”90 A
wrongdoer is ‘neither absurd nor surprising.’” (quoting United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981))).
83. See Blakey & Blakey, supra note 66, at 38 (“Despite this all-inclusive
language, the circuits exclude federal and local governmental agencies from those
who may be sued . . . . Official immunities still apply.”).
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (cross-referencing other federal criminal statutes
as well as providing that certain state crimes constitute racketeering activities).
85. See, e.g., BROWN & PORTER, supra note 7, at § 3:1 (“[The statute’s] list of
predicate offenses is exhaustive as well, and conduct that is not among the
enumerated offenses cannot serve as a predicate to a RICO violation.”).
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (“‘[P]attern of racketeering activity’ requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective
date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding
any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity.”).
87. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (“[T]he term
‘pattern’ itself requires the showing of a relationship between the predicates and
of the threat of continuing activity.” (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970))
(internal citations and quotations omitted)).
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (regarding debts incurred in both gambling
activities and the business of gambling).
89. See S MITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 4.05 (“Like most other parts of the
RICO statute, the definition of unlawful debt is poorly drafted and confusing.”).
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2018) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual,
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legal enterprise requires only proof that the entity has a legal
existence. 91 The “very existence of a corporation meets the
requirement for a separate structure [to prove an enterprise].”92
An association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that
functions with a common purpose.93 In order to show that a group
is an association-in-fact enterprise, the group must have the three
structural features enumerated by the Supreme Court in Boyle v.
United States: 94 “a purpose, relationships among those associated
with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these
associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.”95
The enterprise’s “purpose” does not require an economic
motive as long as the enterprise affects interstate or foreign
commerce.96 For instance, a nonprofit organization sponsoring
protests to shut down abortion clinics satisfies the purpose
requirement although the organization does not have an economic
motivation. 97 Under the “relationship” test in Boyle, an
enterprise-in-fact does not need any specific structure or
relationship among the parties so long as the individuals are
associated in fact for a common purpose of engaging in a course of
conduct. 98 The final feature, “longevity,” is satisfied by “proof that
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. . . .”).
91. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 364 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“[A]ll aspects of the enterprise element are satisfied by the mere proof that the
entity does in fact have a legal existence.”(quotations omitted)).
92. See Webster v. Omnitrition Int’l, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“The participation of a corporation in a racketeering scheme is sufficient, of itself,
to give the enterprise a structure separate from the racketeering activity . . . .”).
93. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (“The enterprise
is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.”).
94. 556 U.S. 938 (2009).
95. Id. at 946.
96. See Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 261 (1994)
(“Congress has not, either in the definitional section or in the operative language,
required that an ‘enterprise’ in § 1962(c) have an economic motive.”).
97. See id. at 258 (“An enterprise surely can have a detrimental influence on
interstate or foreign commerce without having its own profit-seeking motives.”).
98. See Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948 (“[An enterprise-in-fact] group need not have
a hierarchical structure or a ‘chain of command’; decisions may be made on an ad
hoc basis and by any number of methods.”).
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the enterprise had ‘affairs’ of sufficient duration to permit an
associate to ‘participate’ in those affairs through ‘a pattern of
racketeering activity.’”99 Judge Posner found sufficient longevity
in a case where a group defrauded a charitable foundation over the
course of sixteen years. 100 A proponent of a more restrictive reading
of the statute, 101 he begrudgingly recognized that Boyle provides
only a slight difference between a RICO enterprise and a regular
conspiracy.102
The operative section of the statute is divided into four
subsections: § 1962(a) which prohibits any person from investing
in an enterprise with proceeds derived from racketeering
activities; 103 § 1962(b) which bars any person from acquiring an
interest in an enterprise through racketeering activities;104
§ 1962(c) which outlaws operating an enterprise through
racketeering activities; 105 and § 1962(d) which provides that it is
unlawful to conspire to violate the other subsections.106
99. Id. at 946 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
100. See Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A., 610 F.3d 382,
388 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Well, the alleged enterprise in this case had purpose and
relationships and it certainly had ‘longevity,’ and if Boyle is taken at face value
nothing more is required to make a conspiracy a RICO enterprise.”).
101. See G. Robert Blakey, Time-Bars: RICO-Criminal and Civil-Federal and
State, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 1581, 1783 (2013) (“Surely, Judge Posner was
aware that the Supreme Court knew precisely what it did when it rejected the
Bledsoe line of case requiring an ‘ascertainable structure’ as a surrogate for an
organized crime limitation.”).
102. See Hayden Found., 610 F.3d at 388 (arguing that the underlying
conduct was simply conspiracy, but Boyle required the court to consider it a RICO
enterprise).
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2018) (providing that a purchase of securities for
purposes of investment without the intention of controlling the issuer is not
considered illegal under certain conditions).
104. See id. § 1962(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern
of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which
is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”).
105. See id. § 1962(c)
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
106. See id. § 1962(d) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.”).
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Subsections 1962(a) and (b) are sometimes referred to as the
“infiltration” subsections, and § 1962(c) as the “criminally
operated” enterprise subsection. 107 Although the infiltration
subsections were the primary concern of the legislature, 108 the
criminally operated subsection became the primary vehicle for
most RICO prosecutions.109 Cryptocurrency crime occupies a
position between the two most popular uses of RICO—white collar
crime and organized crime.110 It resembles white collar crime due
to cryptocurrency’s potential uses in money laundering 111 and
resembles organized crime due to cryptocurrency’s use in drug
trafficking and sale of illegal goods. 112 Prosecutors have already
attempted a RICO case against a crypto-criminal under the
operation subsection, 113 but whether a crypto-criminal prosecution
could rely on the infiltration subsections requires an examination
of how the underlying cryptocurrency technology and network
function.
107. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 731–32 (categorizing different types of
prosecutions brought under § 1962).
108. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922 (1970) (“[Organized crime’s] money and power are increasingly used to
infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and
corrupt our democratic processes . . . .”).
109. See Murner, supra note 67, at 1640 (noting that “§ 1962(a) [and] § 1962(b)
rarely forms the basis of a RICO action” and § 1962(c) is “the most commonly used
RICO provision”); see also Lynch, supra note 8, at 731 (“Of the 236 RICO
indictments discussed in the sample reported appellate cases, 228 of them appear
to have charged either substantive violations of section 1962(c) or conspiracies to
commit such violations.”).
110. See Blakey & Blakey, supra note 66, at 43 (noting that organized crime
and white collar crime represent the majority of RICO prosecutions).
111. See Edgar G. Sánchez, Crypto-Currencies: The 21st Century’s Money
Laundering and Tax Havens, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 169 (2017) (“[T]he
newest growing concern with Bitcoin, and crypto-currencies in general, [is] their
ability to wash money and conceal taxable income.”).
112. See Press Release, AlphaBay, the Largest Online ‘Dark Market,’ Shut
Down, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/7CD3-24G6 (last visited
Nov. 5, 2019) [hereinafter AlphaBay Shut Down] (stating that online dark-web
marketplaces represent a new form of transnational organized crime) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
113. See Indictment, United States v. Cazes, Case No. 1:17-cr-00144 (E.D.
Cal. June 1, 2017) (charging Cazes under RICO’s operation subsection and
outlining the network of cohorts Cazes used to run an illegal online marketplace).
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C. A Primer on Cryptocurrency

In 2008, an individual or group under the pseudonym Satoshi
Nakamoto published a paper that described Bitcoin, a peer-to-peer
version of electronic cash. 114 Nakamoto’s true identity is unknown
and subject to constant speculation, 115 but it is clear that
Nakamoto designed the network to address failures of financial
institutions in dealing with internet commerce.116 Bitcoin is a
virtual currency which relies on a peer-to-peer ledger protocol to
create a record of bitcoin transfers. 117 These transfers are
documented with pseudo-anonymous identifying information
recorded in a decentralized ledger known as the blockchain.118 The
blockchain functions as a distributed public record of all Bitcoin
transactions, shared with all users of Bitcoin, in order to ensure
that no individual is able to double spend or falsify information on
the ledger. 119
114. See S ATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH
S YSTEM 1 (2008), https://perma.cc/L35Y-PD58 (PDF) (describing a “peer-to-peer
version of electronic cash [that] would allow online payments to be sent directly
from one party to another without going through a financial institution”).
115. See Paul V igna, Is This Satoshi Nakamoto, the Mysterious Creator of
Bitcoin?, WALL S T. J. (Mar. 6, 2014, 9:09 AM), https://perma.cc/TD4Q-SV SG (last
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (discussing a claim by author Leah McGrath that she had
located a Japanese-American named Satoshi Nakamoto) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Paul V igna, Craig Wright Claims He Is Bitcoin
Inventor ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’, WALL S T. J. (May 2, 2016, 11:07 PM),
https://perma.cc/29C3-59CR (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (reporting on a claim by an
Australian businessman Craig Wright that he is Satoshi Nakamoto) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
116. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 114, at 1 (“While the system [relying on
financial institutions] works well enough for most transactions, it still suffers
from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model.”).
117. See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
BITCOIN.ORG ,
https://perma.cc/6GFT-T94N (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“Bitcoin is a consensus
network that enables a new payment system and a completely digital money.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. See Nathaniel Popper, What Is Bitcoin, and How Does It Work?, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/WGV 3-EV 9H (last visited Nov. 5, 2019)
(“Unlike traditional payment networks like V isa, the Bitcoin network is not run
by a single company or person. The system is run by a decentralized network of
computers around the world . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
119. See Some Bitcoin Words You Might Hear, BITCOIN.ORG ,
https://perma.cc/24ZT-AQCD (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) [hereinafter Bitcoin
Vocabulary] (describing the blockchain technology underlying bitcoins and
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Each Bitcoin user controls a Bitcoin wallet to maintain their
bitcoins. 120 The blockchain keeps track of how many bitcoins exist
and which users are authorized to spend them. 121 Each wallet has
a private key which allows the user to authorize transfer of the
bitcoins associated with the wallet. 122 When a user authorizes a
new transaction, the information is broadcast to a network of
computers, known as miners, which use cryptography to ensure
that the user is authorized to transfer those bitcoins. 123 If the
transfer checks out, it is added to the blockchain. 124 The network
rewards the miner who successfully confirmed the pending
transactions with a prize of bitcoins. 125
Though Bitcoin started as a thought experiment, it soon
proved to have real world buying power when a user paid 10,000
bitcoins for two pizzas. 126 Bitcoin grew in value to a staggering
peak of almost twenty thousand dollars per bitcoin in December
2017 before coming back down to earth in the following months.127
defining Bitcoin wallet as an application that accepts bitcoin sent to a certain
address, similar to email, and contains a private key proving that the user is
entitled to spend the bitcoins) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
120. See How Does Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN.ORG, https://perma.cc/7ZZV -CGKH
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (providing information on how to start using Bitcoin)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
121. See id. (“All confirmed transactions are included in the block chain.”).
122. See id. (“Bitcoin wallets keep a secret piece of data called a private key
or seed, which is used to sign transactions, providing a mathematical proof that
they have come from the owner of the wallet.”).
123. See id. (“To be confirmed, transactions must be packed in a block that
fits very strict cryptographic rules that will be verified by the network.”).
124. See id. (“Mining is a distributed consensus system that is used to confirm
pending transactions by including them in the block chain.”).
125. See Bitcoin Vocabulary, supra note 119 (“As a reward for their services,
Bitcoin miners can collect transaction fees for the transactions they confirm, along
with newly created bitcoins.”).
126. See Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED (Nov. 23,
2011, 2:52 PM), https://perma.cc/8YSF-59LK (last visited Nov. 5, 2019)
(recounting the first use of bitcoins for a real-world purchase) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
127. See Can Bitcoin Become a Dominant Currency?, WALL S T. J. (Oct. 21,
2018, 10:07 PM), https://perma.cc/RM3W-F3YT (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“The
price gyrations have come as the cryptocurrency is getting increased scrutiny.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). At Bitcoin’s peak, the 10,000
bitcoins originally spent on two pizzas would have been worth 197.8 million
dollars.

528

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509 (2020)

It spawned a new universe of cryptocurrencies, and the entire
industry peaked in value at $829 billion in early 2018. 128 In order
to facilitate cryptocurrency trading, new online exchanges opened
that allowed customers to trade cryptocurrencies for other
cryptocurrencies or conventional currencies. 129 As the technology
progressed, new cryptocurrencies focused on improving perceived
weaknesses in the Bitcoin model. For example, Monero focus on
providing fully anonymous transactions.130
The underlying blockchain technology behind cryptocurrency
may also have a future in other sectors. 131 The technology could be
used to update traditional ledger systems in any industry that uses
ledgers to keep track of ownership, including real estate.132 A
Goldman Sachs study suggests that blockchain’s use in land titles
could save the title insurance industry up to four billion dollars by
reducing manual searches and accompanying errors. 133 The same
128. See Aaron Hankin, The Cryptocurrency Market Has Shed More Than
$600 Billion From Its Peak—What Exactly Happened?, M ARKET WATCH (Aug. 15,
2018, 8:27 AM), https://perma.cc/A3R9-XV TD (last visited Nov. 5, 2019)
(discussing market capitalization losses in the cryptocurrency industry) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
129. See, e.g., About Coinbase, COINBASE , https://perma.cc/YV 6W-TDZP (last
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“Coinbase is a digital currency wallet and platform where
merchants and consumers can transact with new digital currencies like bitcoin,
ethereum, and litecoin.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
130. See Home, M ONERO, https://perma.cc/S5RN-HT6P (last visited Nov. 5,
2019) (“Monero uses ring signatures, ring confidential transactions, and stealth
addresses to obfuscate the origins, amounts, and destinations of all
transactions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
131. See Reade Ryan & Mayme Donohue, Securities on Blockchain, 73 BUS.
LAW. 85, 92 (2018) (discussing Overstock.com’s use of blockchain technology in
offering securities); Maksymilian Ewendt, Note, Leveraging Blockchain
Technology in Property Records: Establishing Trust in A Risk-Filled Market, 19
N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 99, 105 (2017) (“Real property is a segment of the
economy that holds a tremendous amount of wealth, similar to currency, and
similarly could be primed for an influx of technological innovation.”); Stephen J.
Obie & Mark W. Rasmussen, How Regulation Could Help Cryptocurrencies Grow,
HARV . BUS. REV . (July 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/56E4-FPV S (last visited Nov. 5,
2019) (discussing how securities law might apply to cryptocurrency) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
132. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV . 805, 873–74
(2015) (“[Blockchain networks] offer the possibility of decentralized and secure
ledgers to maintain digital property, currency, county land records, mortgage
interests, security interests, stock ownership, and much more.”).
133. See GOLDMAN S ACHS, PROFILES IN INNOVATION: BLOCKCHAIN—PUTT I N G
THEORY INTO PRACTICE 5 (May 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/5GUM-2V BX (PDF) (“In
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study suggested sizable cost savings for other industries if they
adopt blockchain technology, including the electricity industry, the
sharing economy, cash securities, and anti-money laundering and
know-your-customer compliance. 134 The cryptocurrency industry’s
success in dealing with its criminal element could affect other
industries’ adoption of the technology. 135 With these rapid
developments as a backdrop, prosecutors did not wait for the
industry to self-regulate and have already turned their focus on
cryptocurrency.
III. The Current Methods of Prosecuting Cryptocurrency
Criminals
A. RICO Prosecution of Alexandre Cazes
On June 1, 2017, a grand jury from the Eastern District of
California indicted Alexandre Cazes on charges stemming from his
creation and operation of AlphaBay, a dark-web marketplace for
illegal goods, controlled substances, and illegal services. 136 The
indictment charged Cazes with conspiracy to engage in a RICO
violation, as well as fifteen other counts. 137 On July 4, 2017,
authorities seized control of AlphaBay and shut down traffic to the
emerging markets, land registration systems could help reduce transaction and
financing costs.”).
134. See id. at 4–5 (“When we consider these applications in real-world
scenarios, the dollar benefits start to become apparent.”).
135. Matthew B. Hoy, An Introduction to the Blockchain and Its Implications
for Libraries and Medicine, M ED. REFERENCE S ERVS. Q., 2017, V ol. 36, No. 3,
273–79 (“Whether the blockchain can overcome this outlaw image and develop to
its full potential as an information storage and verification system remains to be
seen.”).
136. See Indictment at ¶¶ 1–8, United States v. Cazes, Case No. 1:17-cr-00144
(E.D. Cal. June 1, 2017) (charging Cazes for his part in operating AlphaBay).
137. See id. at 10–22 (charging RICO conspiracy, narcotics conspiracy, six
counts of distribution of a controlled substance, conspiracy to commit identity
theft and fraud related to identification documents, four counts of unlawful
transfer of a false identification document, conspiracy to commit access device
fraud, trafficking in device making equipment, and money laundering
conspiracy).
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website. 138 Soon after, authorities arrested Cazes in Thailand.139 A
week later, Cazes killed himself in an apparent suicide while in the
custody of officers from the Narcotics Suppression Bureau in
Thailand. 140 Due to Cazes’s suicide, the case never progressed to
trial and prosecutors dismissed the indictment. 141 The judge
presiding over the ensuing civil forfeiture case granted a default
judgment and found the government alleged sufficient facts to
prove a link between Cazes’s assets and racketeering activities.142
The indictment’s outline of AlphaBay’s operation shows an
online version of traditional organized crime organization,
including numerous subordinate associates engaging in drug
trafficking, forging documents, and money laundering through
Cazes’s platform. 143 A large portion of Cazes’s proceeds from the

138. See AlphaBay Shut Down, supra note 112 (announcing the seizure of
AlphaBay and the arrest of Alexandre Cazes); AlphaBay Seizure Notice, DEP’T OF
JUSTICE (July 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/KK7X-3XT4 (last visited Nov. 5, 2019)
(“[This hidden site has been seized] [s]ince July 4, 2017 as part of a law
enforcement operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration and European law enforcement agencies acting
through Europol . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
139. See AlphaBay Shut Down, supra note 112 (describing Thai authorities’
cooperation in the arrest).
140. See Ngamkham, supra note 34 (reporting that an officer found Cazes
hanged in his cell with no signs of struggle).
141. See Order To Dismiss Indictment, United States v. Cazes, Case No.
1:17-cr-00144 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2018) (dismissing Cazes indictment); see also
William Sassani, Court Rules in Favor of Federal Government in Forfeiture of
Assets Related to Darknet Website, N. CAL. RECORD (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://perma.cc/8ZBT-6LNW (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (discussing the following
civil forfeiture action against Cazes’s estate) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
142. See United States v. 2013 Lamborghini Aventador LP700-4, No.
117-CV -00967 LJO SKO, 2018 WL 3752131, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2018)
(granting default judgment and forfeiture of Cazes’s assets, including several
cryptocurrency wallets, bank accounts, real estate, and a 2013 Lamborghini
Aventador).
143. See Indictment at ¶ 12, United States v. Cazes, Case No. 1:17-cr-00144
(E.D. Cal. June 1, 2017)
Members and associates of [AlphaBay] distributed, and facilitated the
distribution of, controlled substances, . . . distributed, and facilitated
the distribution of, counterfeit and stolen identification
documents, . . . [and] laundered money . . . by maintaining and
controlling digital currency addresses through which customers paid
vendors on the AlphaBay website.
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website were held in various cryptocurrencies144 and AlphaBay’s
operation relied entirely on cryptocurrencies for payment. 145 The
RICO conspiracy charge was predicated on fraud in connection
with identification documents, 146 fraud in connection with access
devices, 147 money laundering, 148 and narcotics trafficking. 149
In cases involving cryptocurrency, investigators face
difficulties in overcoming the anonymous nature of
cryptocurrencies to pinpoint the identity of a suspect. 150 In Cazes’s
case, reports indicate that investigators capitalized on a small
window of opportunity to identify Cazes and capture control of
AlphaBay and his cryptocurrencies. 151 In either a mistake or
oversight, Cazes used his own personal Hotmail account at one
point during the operation of the marketplace, providing the initial

144. See V erified Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem, United States v. Cazes,
Case No. 1:17-at-00557 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2017) (listing Cazes’s assets including
large sums of bitcoin, etherium, zcash and monero).
145. See Indictment at ¶ 3, United States v. Cazes, Case No. 1:17-cr-00144
(E.D. Cal. June 1, 2017) (“AlphaBay required its users to transact in digital
currencies, including Bitcoin, Morrero, and Ethereum. The site did not allow for
transactions in official, government-backed currencies.”).
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2018) (prohibiting knowing transfer or possession
of fraudulent identification documents).
147. See 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (prohibiting fraud in connection with access devices,
i.e. credit and debit cards).
148. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (prohibiting concealment or disguising “the
nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity”).
149. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 843, and 846 (prohibiting manufacture,
distribution, dispensation, or possession of controlled substances; use of a
communication facility in furtherance thereof; and conspiracy to commit the
same).
150. See Thomas Brewster, FBI Has 130 Cryptocurrency-Related
Investigations,
Agent
Says,
BLOOMBERG
(June
27,
2018),
https://perma.cc/6GG8-WBF6 (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (citing statements by
Kyle Armstrong, a supervisory special agent of the FBI, regarding the pros and
cons of investigating cryptocurrency criminals) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
151. See Thomas Brewster, How the Cops Took Down an Alleged $23 Million
Dark Web Drug Kingpin, FORBES (July 20, 2017, 02:30 PM),
https://perma.cc/F2BR-F5PA (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (reporting on the raid that
captured Alexandre Cazes and his open laptop, with access to AlphaBay’s
administrative functions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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link to his identity. 152 This seemingly minor slip-up demonstrates
the difficulty of prosecuting cryptocurrency criminals:
investigators must catch a cryptocurrency criminal by finding
instances of human error. 153 Even with such an error, an
investigator needs extensive knowledge of the cryptocurrency
network and identification of a user can be nearly impossible
without outside information, such as an associated email or
information from service providers. 154
In order to help identify the enterprise behind AlphaBay,
investigators shut down AlphaBay shortly before the raid in order
to ensure that Cazes was logged in as an administrator at the time
officials seized his computer.155 Had this seizure technique failed
and left prosecutors unable to access AlphaBay’s network
administrator functions, this Note’s proposed alternative would
enable prosecutors to rely on Cazes’s infiltration of the various
cryptocurrency networks with ill-gotten gains to prove the
enterprise element of a RICO prosecution. 156 Still, RICO cases
regarding cryptocurrencies are rare and RICO is not the exclusive
tool for prosecuting cryptocurrency criminals engaged in
enterprises.

152. See
id.
(speculating
that
Cazes’s
email
address—Pimp_Alex_91@hotmail.com—was compromised during data breaches
involving MySpace and LinkedIn).
153. See generally NICK FURNEAUX, INVESTIGATING CRYPTOCURRENCI E S :
UNDERSTANDING, EXTRACTING, AND ANALYZING BLOCKCHAIN EVIDENCE 119–267
(2018) (discussing investigative methods used to prosecute cryptocurrency
criminals).
154. See id. at 244 (“Finding a suspect in the real world from blockchain
transactions can be very challenging, and unless you are able to make legal
requests for information from service providers, it can be almost impossible.”); see
also Nina Marino et al., The Dark Side of Bitcoin, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2018, at 36, 40
(regarding the use of confidential informants and undercover investigations in
cryptocurrency investigations).
155. See BREWSTER, supra note 151 (“Just before they swooped
on . . . Cazes . . . , the cops forced the site to go down, leading the suspect to login
to the market’s server and start communicating with the AlphaBay data
centers . . . .”).
156. See infra Part IV (discussing prosecution of cryptocurrency criminals
using the cryptocurrency network as the enterprise).
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B. RICO Alternatives
Ross Ulbricht operated Silk Road, an online marketplace that
preceded AlphaBay and sold drugs and other illegals goods using
bitcoins as its exclusive payment system. 157 Instead of prosecuting
under RICO, prosecutors employed the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise (CCE) statute. 158 The CCE statute shares a similar
structure with RICO and enables prosecution if the accused
occupied a supervisory position over at least five other individuals
and obtained substantial income or resources. 159 However,
prosecutions under CCE are limited to prosecutions of federal drug
offenses against drug kingpins. 160 By comparison, RICO retains a
much more flexible application due to the statute’s broad language
and inclusive definition of racketeering activities. 161 While CCE
prosecutions may suit online drug kingpins, employing RICO
against cryptocurrency criminals as this Note suggests will result
in a streamlining of the investigation methods against
cryptocurrency criminals because the enterprise element can be
the same in each case. 162
Prosecutors may also choose to ignore any potential RICO
concerns, exercise prosecutorial discretion, and charge only the
underlying predicate crimes. In 2014, a New York grand jury
charged Bitcoin entrepreneurs Charlie Shrem and Robert Faiella
with operating an unlicensed money transmitting business and
157. See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2017)
(summarizing Ulbricht’s conviction for drug trafficking associated with his
website, Silk Road), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018).
158. See Indictment, United States v. Ulbricht, Case No. 1:14-cr-00068
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2014) (charging Ross with crimes stemming from his operation
of Silk Road).
159. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2018) (providing higher penalties for committing
two or more violations of controlled substances statutes in a position of
management over five or more other persons).
160. See Susan W. Brenner, S.C.A.R.F.A.C.E.: A Speculation on Double
Jeopardy and Compound Criminal Liability, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV . 915, 936 (1993)
(“Given these limitations, CCE might properly be termed a ‘minor RICO
statute.’”).
161. See id. (“RICO can be used against anyone who commits, facilitates or
agrees to the commission of ‘racketeering activity.’”).
162. See infra Part IV (discussing how investigation of bitcoin usage can prove
the investments of proceeds and the enterprise required for a RICO violation).
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conspiring to commit money laundering in connection with drug
purchases on Silk Road. 163 Both charged crimes are RICO
predicate crimes. 164 Faiella operated a Bitcoin exchange on Silk
Road, and Schrem used his position at another Bitcoin exchange to
anonymously provide the bitcoins for Faiella’s exchange. 165 The
indictment also indicated that both Faiella and Schrem operated
the scheme as a business, which might have satisfied the RICO
enterprise requirement. 166 Three years later, a California grand
jury indicted another bitcoin entrepreneur, Alexander Vinnik, on
nineteen counts under the same statutes and two counts of
engaging in unlawful monetary transactions. 167 Vinnik oversaw
BTC-e, a cryptocurrency exchange which allowed users to
anonymously exchange cryptocurrencies for conventional
currencies and failed to comply with anti-money-laundering and
know-your-customer laws. 168 Despite the potential applicability of
RICO, prosecutors did not secure an indictment under the statute
for either case.
In light of the broad applicability of RICO, the DOJ created
requirements for authorizing the use of RICO that limit its use.

163. See Indictment, United States v. Faiella, Case No. 1:14-cr-00243-JSR
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2014), ECF No. 17 (charging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956
and 1960); see also Press Release, Bitcoin Exchangers Plead Guilty in Manhattan
Federal Court in Connection with the Sale of Approximately $1 Million in Bitcoins
for Use on the Silk Road Website, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE , S. DIST. OF N.Y. (Sept.
4, 2014), https://perma.cc/4HV L-S9L2 (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (discussing the
resulting guilty pleas of Robert Faiella and Charlie Shrem) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
164. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2018) (“‘[R]acketeering activities means . . . any
act which is indictable under . . . section 1956 (relating to the laundering of
monetary instruments) . . . [and] section 1960 (relating to illegal money
transmitters) . . . .”).
165. See Indictment, United States v. Faiella, Case No. 1:14-cr-00243-JSR
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2014), ECF No. 17 (alleging that Faiella operated the exchange
under the username “BTCKing,” and that Shrem knew he was facilitating Silk
Road transactions).
166. See id. (alleging that Faiella and Schrem operated a money transmitting
business affecting interstate commerce).
167. See Superseding Indictment, United States v. BTC-E, Case No. CR
16-00227 SI (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017) (discussing Alexander V innik’s operation of
a digital currency exchange and his alleged involvement in ransomware attacks,
drug trafficking, identity theft, fraud, and money laundering).
168. See id. at ¶¶ 32–43.
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Any prosecution of cryptocurrency criminals must satisfy these
requirements:
[A] government attorney should seek approval for a RICO
charge only if one or more of the following requirements is
present:
1.

RICO is necessary to ensure that the indictment
adequately reflects the nature and extent of the
criminal conduct involved in a way that prosecution
only on the underlying charges would not;

2.

A RICO prosecution would provide the basis for an
appropriate sentence under all the circumstances of the
case in a way that prosecution only on the underlying
charges would not;

3.

A RICO charge could combine related offenses which
would otherwise have to be prosecuted separately in
different jurisdictions;

4.

RICO is necessary for a successful prosecution of the
government’s case against the defendant or a
codefendant;

5.

Use of RICO would provide a reasonable expectation of
forfeiture which is proportionate to the underlying
criminal conduct;

6.

The case consists of violations of State law, but local law
enforcement officials are unlikely or unable to
successfully prosecute the case, in which the federal
government has a significant interest;

7.

The case consists of violations of State law, but involves
prosecution of significant or government individuals,
which may pose special problems for the local
prosecutor. 169

These factors address the DOJ’s concerns regarding potential
prosecutorial overreach through RICO and ensure that RICO is
only used when necessary. 170 It is possible that the activities of
169. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-110.310 (2020).
170. See id. at § 9-110.200 (“Despite the broad statutory language of RICO
and the legislative intent that the statute ‘. . . shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purpose,’ it is the policy of the Criminal Division that RICO
be selectively and uniformly used.”).
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Faiella, Schrem, and Vinnik simply did not meet these
requirements.
IV. Cryptocurrencies as the “Enterprise”
Cryptocurrency criminals have infiltrated a legitimate
enterprise: the Bitcoin network. This Note proposes protecting
legitimate enterprises like Bitcoin with a novel alternative for
prosecuting cryptocurrency criminals. Prosecutors should use the
cryptocurrency network relationship to support prosecution under
§ 1962(a), which bars infiltration of an enterprise through
racketeering activities. 171 In this scenario, the cryptocurrency and
its users are “the victim of the activity” of criminals considered by
§ 1962(a) of the RICO statute. 172 Under this proposal, the
prosecutor’s investigation of a criminal’s use of cryptocurrency will
satisfy both the investment requirements and the enterprise
requirement of § 1962(a). 173 This approach reinvigorates RICO’s
initial purpose stated in the statute’s legislative history: to prevent
the infiltration of legitimate enterprises.174 It also lowers the
investigatory resources required to demonstrate the “enterprise.”
Instead of having to investigate the relationships among the
associates of the criminal enterprise, 175 prosecutors will be able to
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2018)
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
activity . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
172. See Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259 (1994)
(“The ‘enterprise’ referred to in subsections (a) and (b) is thus something acquired
through the use of illegal activities or by money obtained from illegal activities.
The enterprise in these subsections is the victim of unlawful activity . . . .”).
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2018) (regarding investment in enterprises with
racketeering proceeds).
174. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (“[T]itle
IX is aimed at removing organized crime from our legitimate organizations.”).
175. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009) (requiring
prosecutors to show group members are “associated together for a common
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct” in order to prove an association-in-fact
enterprise).
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rely on publicly available information in order to prove the
enterprise.176
A. Criminal Prosecution of Cryptocurrency Criminals Under
§ 1962(a)
The government can prove a criminal violation of § 1962(a) by
showing “the existence of an enterprise, the defendant’s derivation
of income from a pattern of racketeering activity, and the use of
any part of that income in acquiring an interest in or operating the
enterprise.”177 A civil plaintiff must also show causation between
the investment and an injury in order to have standing. 178
1. The Enterprise Requirement
The enterprise requirement should be satisfied by the
cryptocurrency and its network of users. 179 Cryptocurrencies are
not legal entities. The status of an enterprise as a legal association
depends on its legal existence as a corporation, partnership, or
other legal entity. 180 Bitcoin, the original cryptocurrency, does not
176. See infra Section IV .A.1 (discussing the association requirements for
cryptocurrencies).
177. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1983).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2018) (“Any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor
in any appropriate United States district court . . . .”); see also N. Cypress Med.
Ctr. Operating Co. v. Cigna Healthcare, 781 F.3d 182, 202 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 441 (5th Cir. 2000))
To state a claim under § 1962(a), North Cypress had to plead: “(1) the
existence of an enterprise, (2) the defendant’s derivation of income from
a pattern of racketeering activity, and (3) the use of any part of that
income in acquiring an interest in or operating the enterprise.”
Additionally, North Cypress had to show a nexus between the claimed
violations and injury.
179. See 556 U.S. at 946 (“[A]n association-in-fact enterprise must have at
least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated
with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue
the enterprise’s purpose.”).
180. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 364 (3d Cir. 2010)
(providing the standard of proof for the legal existence of a corporation,
partnership, or other legal entities).
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exist as a legal entity in any form, but rather exists simply as an
open source protocol 181 with individual bitcoins considered a
commodity. 182 With other cryptocurrencies relying on similar
blockchain protocols, 183 each cryptocurrency network itself is
typically not a legal entity even if some cryptocurrencies are
associated with legal entities.184
Cryptocurrencies should constitute an association-in-fact
enterprise under Boyle because they have the “three [required]
structural features: a purpose, relationships among those
associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit
these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” 185 First, the
purpose of cryptocurrencies is to function as an alternative form of
currency. 186 They provide several benefits over traditional
currencies including lower costs, easier transferability, and less
risk by eliminating double spending. 187 All users, legitimate and
illegitimate, work together towards the common purpose of
keeping track of Bitcoin transactions. 188
181. See Who Owns Bitcoin.org?, About Bitcoin.org, BITCOIN.ORG ,
https://perma.cc/WK8W-YUT9 (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (providing that no one
owns Bitcoin because it is a protocol and that the network requires consensus
between all the platform’s users) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
182. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d
213, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“V irtual currencies can be regulated by CFTC as a
commodity.”).
183. See, e.g., TETHER LTD., TETHER: FIAT CURRENCIES ON THE BITCOIN
BLOCKCHAIN (2016), https://perma.cc/A4AW-SWSZ (PDF) (describing Tether, a
cryptocurrency-fiat currency hybrid which “exist[s] on the Bitcoin blockchain”).
184. See, e.g., Contact Us, TETHER, https://perma.cc/HTE8-GNT5 (last visited
Nov. 5, 2019) (noting Tether Limited, the legal entity that controls Tether
cryptocurrency, “is incorporated in Hong Kong”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
185. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946.
186. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 114, at 1 (describing a bitcoin as electronic
cash).
187. See Kevin V . Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency
Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV . 271, 282 (2015) (“The most
commonly cited benefits of bitcoin are: (1) lower costs and fees, (2) fewer risks for
merchants, (3) increased anonymity for users, (4) increased speed and ease of
transfer/payment, and (5) less susceptibility to government manipulation and
inflationary pressures.”).
188. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 114, at 3 (setting out the Bitcoin network and
how transactions will be verified).
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Second, the relationship among those associated with a
cryptocurrency enterprise occurs naturally as a result of the
creation of the blockchain and consensus network of
cryptocurrency.189 Each transaction between Bitcoin users is
registered in the blockchain, a “record of all the debits, credits and
balances associated with each unique bitcoin address.”190 Each
transfer is broadcasted to the Bitcoin network, where it is
examined by miners—computers which gather the information
from the transaction and ensure that it matches the previous
transactions before adding it to the blockchain. 191 Upon
successfully adding the new transaction to the blockchain, the
miner is rewarded with a small amount of bitcoin. 192 Thus, each
Bitcoin transaction represents a relationship between at least
three users: the sender of the bitcoin, the recipient of the bitcoin,
and the miner. 193 Each transaction requires this relationship,
constantly deepening the web of relationships amongst the users
of the Bitcoin enterprise. 194
Finally, cryptocurrency networks show longevity because they
are intended as a long-term alternative to currency. 195 The last
Bitcoin prize for mining will not be issued until approximately
2140. 196 Bitcoin is designed to serve as an alternative to traditional
189. See PAUL V IGNA & M ICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF CRYPTOCURRE N C Y
121–37 (2015) (describing an interconnected network of users and the public
ledger system that underlies cryptocurrencies).
190. Id.
191. See id. at 129 (“The miner’s software client takes the hash of the first
transaction—with the pool of underlying date contained within it—and combines
it with the raw data of the next unhashed transaction to form a new hash.”).
192. See id. (discussing the reasons for bitcoin miners to expend computing
power to assist with the maintenance of the network).
193. See id. at 130 (discussing the requirement of consensus between the
information provided by the sender and the information found on the blockchain
by the miner before the payment to the recipient is confirmed).
194. See id. at 131 (“[T]he latest block is now mathematically linked to the
blockchain, as if to form the latest in an ever growing line of trailer hitches.”).
195. See Eric Lam & Lauren Leatherby, From Pizza to Lambos: Charting
Bitcoin’s First Decade, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/R56G-MBE4
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (charting the use of bitcoins from 2008 through 2018)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
196. See Evelyn Cheng, There Are Now 17 Million Bitcoins in Existence—Only
4 Million Left to ‘Mine’,
CNBC (Apr. 26, 2018, 2:26 PM),
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currency 197 and the network has already existed for over ten
years. 198 The network’s long-term focus on serving as an
alternative to traditional financial institutions demonstrates
longevity sufficient to pursue its purpose. 199
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the statute’s
broad applicability should not extend to absurd results. 200 In order
to distinguish absurd results from a proper application of the
statute, Chief Judge Posner analyzed how closely an alleged
enterprise resembled a “prototypical” RICO enterprise. 201 First,
the court defined a prototypical case: where a criminal seizes
control of a legitimate firm and uses the firm to engage in criminal
acts. 202 Cryptocurrency criminals do not satisfy this prototypical
case because they do not control the entire cryptocurrency
network. 203 The court describes the next closest case as one where
the criminal uses the enterprise to conduct criminal activities, but
the enterprise continues its legitimate operations.204 Judge Posner
noted that such a situation is close to the prototypical case and falls
https://perma.cc/LN2Q-ENMS (last updated Apr. 30, 2018, 2:33 P.M.) (last visited
Nov. 5, 2019) (“The remaining 4 million coins aren’t expected to be mined
completely for another 122 years.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
197. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 114, at 1 (proposing peer-to-peer electronic
cash to avoid using financial institutions).
198. See Lam & Leatherby, supra note 195 (reporting on Bitcoin’s creation in
2008 and the first transaction for two pizzas in 2010).
199. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009) (requiring “longevity
sufficient to permit [the] associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose”).
200. See Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 226 (7th Cir. 1997)
(“When a statute is broadly worded in order to prevent loopholes from being
drilled in it by ingenious lawyers, there is a danger of its being applied to
situations absurdly remote from the concerns of the statute’s framers.”).
201. Id. at 227.
202. See id. (discussing how a criminal could “uses the firm’s resources,
contacts, facilities, and appearance of legitimacy to perpetrate more, and less
easily discovered, criminal acts than he could do in his own person”).
203. See Camila Russo, Bitcoin Speculators, Not Drug Dealers, Dominate
Crypto
Use
Now,
BLOOMBERG
(August
7,
2018,
7:15
AM),
https://perma.cc/YR68-8DDH (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (interviewing Drug
Enforcement Administration Agent Lilita Infante who reported that illegal
activity constitutes approximately ten percent of cryptocurrency transactions) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
204. See Fitzgerald, 116 F.3d at 227 (“[M]any of the employees of the business
may be unaware that it is controlled and being used by a criminal.”).
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under the auspices of the statute. 205 Cryptocurrency crime fits
squarely into this category, with criminals representing a sizable,
but not overwhelming, portion of the cryptocurrency network. 206
Further concerns about including cryptocurrency networks
under an expansive reading of the statute can be dispelled by
examining the guidance of Boyle, which provided:
Such a[n enterprise] need not have a hierarchical structure or a
“chain of command”; decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis
and by any number of methods—by majority vote, consensus, a
show of strength, etc. Members of the group need not have fixed
roles; different members may perform different roles at
different times. The group need not have a name, regular
meetings, dues, established rules and regulations, disciplinary
procedures, or induction or initiation ceremonies. While the
group must function as a continuing unit and remain in
existence long enough to pursue a course of conduct, nothing in
RICO exempts an enterprise whose associates engage in spurts
of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence. 207

Given the Court’s endorsement of consensus decision-making and
exhaustive list of inessential features, the relationships among
cryptocurrency users should be sufficient to demonstrate that the
network is “a group of persons associated together for a common
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” 208
2. Investment or Use in an Enterprise
Keeping with RICO’s broad construction requirement, 209 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that “[t]he key operative
205. See id. (“The second step is to determine how close to the prototype the
case before the court is—how close, in other words, the family resemblance is
between the prototypical case and the case at hand.”).
206. See Sean Foley et. al., Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity
is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?, 32 REV . OF FIN. S TUD. 1798, 1800 (2019)
(“[A]pproximately one-quarter of all users (26%) and close to one-half of bitcoin
transactions (46%) are associated with illegal activity.”).
207. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948 (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 946 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
209. See United States v. V ogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1194 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding
that there is no rigorous amount of proof required to tie together the crime, the
proceeds and the use or investment).
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terms of the section [regarding investment of proceeds] are
expansive, not restrictive ones: ‘use or invest,’ ‘any part,’
‘income . . . or . . . proceeds,’ ‘directly or indirectly,’ ‘establishment
or operation.’”210 This same sentiment is echoed in a later Second
Circuit opinion, which stated that “the numerous disjuncts in
§ 1962(a) create a broad prohibition.”211 To illustrate how the
statute might apply: Alexandre Cazes “used” the “proceeds” of the
drug sales and other “racketeering activities” on AlphaBay directly
in the “operation” of the Bitcoin network—the “enterprise”—by
requiring AlphaBay users to pay in bitcoins, making the Bitcoin
network track and verify each transaction, and storing the
proceeds of the transactions in bitcoins. 212 Typically, the reason not
to proceed under § 1962(a) is that it is difficult to track and prove
the investment. 213 The same concern does not apply to Bitcoin
transactions because the network stores a public record of every
prior transaction. 214 In order to connect a Bitcoin wallet to an
individual, an investigator must tie a private Bitcoin user’s private
information to a public transaction record. 215 But once the
connection is made, the investigator will have an easier time
proving that the bitcoins were used in an illicit transaction and
that the proceeds of the transaction were used in the Bitcoin
network enterprise.216
Despite apparently being allowed under Turkette,
association-in-fact enterprises thus far do not appear in § 1962(a)
cases. 217 This may be because § 1962(a) cases are rare. 218 Some
210. Id.
211. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 652 F.3d 310, 322 (2d Cir. 2011).
212. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2018).
213. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 691 (asserting that it is usually difficult and
burdensome to prove the connection between the racketeering activities and the
investment).
214. See Blockchain Explorer, supra note 38 (showing the entire blockchain
history of Bitcoin).
215. See generally FURNEAUX, supra note 153 (discussing investigative
methods used to prosecute cryptocurrency criminals).
216. See Marino, supra note 154, 40–41 (discussing the government’s tracing
methods once an investigator has identified illicit usage of cryptocurrency).
217. See S MITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 3.02 (asserting that the Court’s
argument in Turkette is so obviously incorrect that federal prosecutors have not
tested its bounds).
218. See id. at § 5.02 (“[S]ection 1962(a) attracted little notice from
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commentators argue that the Turkette decision is absurd when
applied to § 1962(a) and (b) because RICO would punish racketeers
for investing racketeer proceeds back into their own illegal
association-in-fact enterprises. 219 Three reasons reduce this
concern when applying the statute to cryptocurrency criminals.
First, the statute contains a single definition for enterprise,
which includes both legal and association-in-fact enterprises.220 It
is difficult to see how the “enterprise” under one subsection is
somehow different than the “enterprise” under a different
subsection, when both subsections rely on the exact same
definition. 221 Second, a crypto-criminal is using a legitimate
enterprise, the cryptocurrency network. 222 One district court
recognized that proving a legitimate association-in-fact enterprise
is theoretically possible and seemingly fits within the language
and purpose of the statute. 223 Finally, Boyle reaffirmed the
Supreme Court’s commitment to broadly construe RICO to
effectuate its remedial purposes. 224 If applied to cryptocurrencies
under § 1962(a), the statute is still being used to eliminate
criminal influences on legitimate enterprises in harmony with its
purpose. 225
prosecutors.”).
219. See id. at § 3.02 (“The Court did not deign to explain what possible
purpose could be served by prohibiting racketeers from investing ill-gotten income
in their illegal businesses . . . .”)
220. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2018) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity . . . .”).
221. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981) (rejecting the
argument that each subsection of the statute addresses a different type of
enterprise, legitimate or illegitimate).
222. See supra Part II.C (concerning the legitimate uses of cryptocurrency).
223. See Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 777 F. Supp. 1043, 1055 (D.P.R. 1991),
aff’d sub nom. Rodriguez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 990 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1993) (“A
plaintiff could conceivably prove an association-in-fact that is completely
legitimate except for the fact that one of its associates is using the entity, even
perhaps without the knowledge of any of the other associates, for the purpose of
engaging in the RICO predicate act pattern . . . .”).
224. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) (“[T]he very concept
of an association in fact is expansive.”).
225. See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591 (“[T]he legislative history forcefully
supports the view that the major purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration
of legitimate business by organized crime.”).
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If criminal RICO works under this concept, civil complainants
face yet another barrier to using cryptocurrencies to support their
RICO cases. In order to establish standing, civil RICO plaintiffs in
a majority of circuits must allege that they suffered an “investment
injury” resulting from the investment or use of the proceeds in the
enterprise.226 Given the fluctuating markets of cryptocurrencies,227
plaintiffs may have difficulties showing the connection between a
criminal’s use of a cryptocurrency and an injury that is concrete
and particularized enough to allow standing. 228
B. Potential Bars to Cryptocurrencies as an Enterprise-in-Fact
1. Cryptocurrency as the Enterprise Will Likely Not Work Under
§ 1962(c)
Although RICO has been liberally construed, 229 the Supreme
Court instituted a requirement for how much control an individual
must have over a criminally operated enterprise in Reves v. Ernst
& Young. 230 Subsection 1962(c) prohibits any person from
participating in an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity. 231 In interpreting the statute in Reves, the
226. See S MITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 6.04(6)(a) (“The First, Second,
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have held
that an investment injury is required under section 1962(a). The Fourth Circuit
has held otherwise.” (citations omitted)).
227. See Jeremy Swinfen Green, Understanding Cryptocurrency Market
Fluctuations, TELEGRAPH (July 19, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://perma.cc/4TPC-89UC
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“V olatility, recent hacks and the threat of taxation all
add to the uncertainties surrounding [cryptocurrencies].”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
228. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (requiring an
injury that is “concrete and particularized”).
229. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (discussing
the legislative history of the statute and Congress’s “self-consciously expansive
language and overall approach”).
230. 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993) (holding that “‘to conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs,’ [under] § 1962(c), one
must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself”).
231. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2018)
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
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Court approved of an “operation or management” test requiring a
RICO target to “participate in the operation or management of the
enterprise itself.” 232 The required degree of control over the
operation or management of the enterprise is currently unclear,
with courts finding participation when a company exercised “some
direction over” the members of an enterprise 233 but not when a
maintenance worker “transported some stolen beer and lamps to
buyers and returned most of the proceeds from the sales to [a drug
dealer].” 234 This lack of clarity may discourage the proposed
prosecution, which can be remedied by instead using § 1962(a) for
prosecution of cryptocurrency criminals. 235
In Reves, the Court distinguished subsection (c) of the statute
from subsections (a) and (b) on the grounds that (c) governed
individuals with some level of control in the enterprise, while (a)
and (b) governed individuals outside of the enterprise.236 Thus, the
operation or management test is not a bar to the proposed
prosecution if employed in a § 1962(a) claim.
2. Prosecutorial Discretion and the Justice Manual
Given RICO’s broad statutory language, the DOJ recognizes
that every case that meets the statute’s technical requirements
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
232. Reves, 507 U.S. at 184 (“[I]t is clear that Congress did not intend to
extend RICO liability under § 1962(c) beyond those who participate in the
operation or management of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity.”).
233. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir.
2006) (ruling on violations of RICO stemming from a pattern of Immigration and
Nationality Act violations).
234. United States v. V iola, 35 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (considering a
violation of RICO resulting from a drug and stolen property importation and
distribution crime network).
235. See supra Part IV .A; 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2018) (prohibiting investment
of proceeds from racketeering patterns in an enterprise).
236. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 185 (“Infiltration of legitimate organizations by
‘outsiders’ is clearly addressed in subsections (a) and (b), and the ‘operation or
management’ test that applies under subsection (c) in no way limits the
application of subsections (a) and (b) to ‘outsiders.’”).
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should not be prosecuted. 237 Instead of leaving the decision to
individual prosecutors, the Organized Crime and Gang Section
within the Criminal Division of the DOJ oversees and approves the
commencement of prosecutions under RICO. 238 A government
attorney should only seek approval of a RICO prosecution if the
case satisfies one or more of the requirements contained in the
DOJ’s Justice Manual. 239 Moreover, the Justice Manual provides
that “the Criminal Division will not approve ‘imaginative’
prosecutions under RICO which are far afield from the
congressional purpose of the RICO statute.” 240 Two of the seven
requirements for approval are particularly applicable to
cryptocurrency criminals.
Due in part to the widespread availability of the internet,
cryptocurrency crimes often transcend state and international
borders. 241 This international usage makes it difficult to charge
“related offenses which would otherwise have to be prosecuted
separately in different jurisdictions.” 242 For example, in the
investigation of Cazes, the DOJ had to contend with an individual
with two foreign citizenships, residing in Thailand, selling drugs
throughout the United States. 243 In Ulbricht’s case, the
prosecution accused Ulbricht of facilitating drug sales to over one
hundred thousand purchasers worldwide. 244
237. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , JUSTICE M ANUAL § 9-110.200 (2016) (“Despite
the broad statutory language of RICO and the legislative intent that the
statute ‘. . . shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose,’ it is
the policy of the Criminal Division that RICO be selectively and uniformly used.”).
238. See id. at §§ 9-110.101, 9-110.210 (“No RICO criminal indictment or
information or civil complaint shall be filed, and no civil investigative demand
shall be issued, without the prior approval of the Criminal Division.”).
239. See id. at § 9-110.310 (requiring potential RICO cases to satisfy one of
seven prerequisites for RICO prosecution).
240. Id. at § 9-110.200.
241. See Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies; Bitcoin & What Now After
Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 4, 2014, at 1,
38 (“V irtual currencies present particularly difficult law enforcement challenges
because of their ability to transcend national borders in the fraction of a second,
unique jurisdictional issues and anonymity due to encryption.”).
242. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , JUSTICE M ANUAL § 9-110.310 (2020).
243. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Cazes, Case No. 1:17-cr-00144
(E.D. Cal. June 1, 2017) (charging predicate crimes originating in both New York
and California against a Canadian citizen by birth with citizenship in Antigua
and Barbuda residing in Bangkok, Thailand).
244. See Indictment, United States v. Ulbricht, Case No. 1:14-cr-00068
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RICO is sometimes “necessary to ensure that the indictment
adequately reflects the nature and extent of the criminal conduct”
in cryptocurrency crimes. 245 RICO was designed to protect
innocent individuals. 246 The cryptocurrency marketplace is
sensitive to criminal activities. Government seizures and criminal
prosecutions may result in violent swings in the value of a
cryptocurrency, through no fault of the innocent user. 247 For
example, after the closure of Silk Road, bitcoins lost approximately
a quarter of their value. 248 Cryptocurrency networks support a
wide range of economic activities, including holding
cryptocurrencies as an investment. 249 Yet continued criminal use
of cryptocurrencies limits how much industrial investors are
willing to participate in the market. 250 The “nature and extent” of
Silk Road’s effect on innocent Bitcoin users was not adequately
reflected by the prosecution of just the underlying predicate acts
because innocent Bitcoin users suffered personal losses as a result
of Ulbricht’s actions, which affected the viability of the Bitcoin
enterprise.251
A final potential bar in the DOJ guidelines is that the
Criminal Division will not approve “imaginative” prosecutions not
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2014) (“The website was used by several thousand drug dealers
and other unlawful vendors to distribute hundreds of kilograms of illegal drugs
and other illegal goods and services to well over a hundred thousand buyers
worldwide . . . .”).
245. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , JUSTICE M ANUAL § 9-110.310 (2020).
246. See 115 CONG. REC. 6993 (1969) (“In addition to this criminal prohibition,
the bill also creates civil remedies for the honest businessman who has been
damaged by unfair competition from the racketeer businessman.”).
247. See Alex Hern, Bitcoin Price Plummets After Silk Road Closure,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2013), https://perma.cc/Z94A-PAZF (last visited Nov. 5, 2019)
(discussing Bitcoin’s price drop following the arrest of Ross Ulbricht and the
closure of Silk Road) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
248. See id. (documenting Bitcoin’s price drop from $145.70 down to $109.76).
249. See generally CHRIS BURNISKE & JACK TATAR, CRYPTOASSETS: THE
INNOVATIVE INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO BITCOIN AND BEYOND (2017) (summarizing
investment strategies for cryptocurrency).
250. See PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, supra note 20, at 1, 6 (stating that
Bitcoin’s illicit usage raises concerns among stakeholders and that the industry
will have to undergo several “credentialing moments” on the path to legitimacy).
251. See id. at 13 (discussing regulatory steps that governments are taking in
light of the illegal use of cryptocurrency).
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in line with Congress’s original focus on organized crime. 252 This
Note does not suggest that every single crypto-crime should be
prosecuted under RICO, but rather only those crimes that reflect
the same fears of Congress that motivated the statute. 253 The law’s
passage was predicated on findings that organized crime money
was being used to “infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business” and
that organized crime activities “harm innocent investors.”254 A
Senate report stated that the law’s purpose was the “elimination
of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into
legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.”255
Cryptocurrencies networks are an inventive organization of people
working together to do business through a new innovation worthy
of protection. 256
3. General Criticism of Novel RICO Cases
Peter J. Henning, a professor at Wayne State University and
New York Times author, wrote that judges often take “a dim view
of efforts to turn what look like ordinary state law claims into
federal cases by claiming a RICO violation.” 257 Criticisms of the
expansive use of RICO have continued since it exploded in usage
in the 1970s. 258 G. Robert Blakey—an author of the statute,
vociferous defender of RICO, and former Notre Dame Law
professor—responded to some these criticism in a law review
article. 259 In response to criticisms that RICO was subject to
252. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , JUSTICE M ANUAL § 9-110.200 (2016).
253. See supra Part II.A (regarding the original motivation for passing RICO).
254. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2018)).
255. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76 (1969).
256. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 114, at 8 (“We have proposed a system for
electronic transactions without relying on trust.”).
257. Henning, supra note 14; see also G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry,
An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various
Proposals for Reform: “Mother of God—Is This the End of RICO?”, 43 V AND. L.
REV . 851, 987 (1990) (“When the private bar began to bring RICO suits, the
district courts reacted with hostility and undertook judicially to redraft the
statute in an effort to dismiss civil suits in all possible ways.”).
258. See Blakey, supra note 257, at 857–59 (analyzing myths regarding the
overuse of RICO and supporting its continued viability).
259. See id. at 859 (“If these efforts [to rewrite RICO] succeed, victims of
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abusive lawsuits, Blakey analyzed a list of cases labeled “abusive”
by the Business/Labor Coalition for Civil RICO Reform.260 He
noted that even in these abusive civil cases, the system weeded out
the egregious examples quickly and courts dismissed the cases.261
RICO was enacted to provide a “gap filler” to allow prosecution of
organized crime. 262 Cryptocurrency crimes likely fall into the broad
net purposefully cast by Congress in enacting RICO and should not
be considered an abusive use of the statute. 263 In fact, Professor
Lynch argued that imaginative prosecutions have the tacit
endorsement of Congress in light of legislative inaction after broad
interpretations of the statute by the Supreme Court. 264
V. Conclusion
RICO is an incredibly broad statute. 265 Conversations
regarding the law are typically not concerned with what it can do,
but what it should do. 266 Judges look favorably upon criminal
sophisticated forms of crime everywhere will be harmed.”).
260. See id. at 877 (“The charge that the right to file civil RICO suits is being
abused was, until recently, just that: a charge.”).
261. See id. (noting that this is the system working correctly to eliminate
frivolous cases).
262. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S UP.
CT. REV . 345, 381 (1994) (“In many of these settings, RICO, much like the criminal
fraud statutes, operates as a ‘gap filler,’ permitting extension of federal criminal
law to species of misconduct that Congress has failed to address through specific
legislation.”).
263. See supra Part IV (outlining how cryptocurrency networks might satisfy
the association-in-fact enterprise).
264. See Lynch, supra note 8, at 713 (“If RICO has evolved into something
different from what Congress intended at its creation, it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that Congress has looked at what has evolved, and pronounced it
good.”).
265. See BROWN & PORTER, supra note 7, at § 1:1 (“RICO was intentionally
written broadly . . . .”).
266. Compare Nora Freeman Engstrom, Retaliatory RICO and the Puzzle of
Fraudulent Claiming, 115 M ICH. L. REV . 639, 699 (2017) (arguing that RICO
might have application in egregious cases of attorney fraud but suggesting that it
should not be used when concerning routine litigation activities), with Briana
Lynn Rosenbaum, The RICO Trend in Class Action Warfare, 102 IOWA L. REV.
165, 220 (2016) (“Even if frivolous litigation is a genuine problem in aggregate
litigation, this Article demonstrates why the RICO reprisal must be rejected as a
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RICO prosecutions while turning up their noses to civil cases using
the same operative sections. 267 Perhaps the true question of
whether to employ RICO should be based on whether a particular
case reflects Congress’s original concern with organized crime.268
Cryptocurrency is a young industry which has become a target for
criminals. 269 Cryptocurrency networks are groups of users working
together to provide legitimate alternatives to traditional financial
institutions. 270 When criminals use cryptocurrency, they are
interfering with the legitimate business of the cryptocurrency
network and its users. 271 Although this Note proposes a novel
RICO application, the argument is predicated on addressing the
situation where criminals have infiltrated a legitimate
cryptocurrency business and their activities substantially affect its
operations, in accordance with the purpose of the statute described
in Turkette. 272 Keeping that purpose in mind, small instances of
cryptocurrency crime should not be prosecuted under the statute.
However, RICO can be put to good use to protect the
cryptocurrency industry when someone engages in an organized
and systematic criminal effort to abuse and infiltrate a
cryptocurrency network.

remedy.”).
267. See S MITH & REED, supra note 9, at § 1.02 (asserting that judges
inappropriately extend the law to catch criminals).
268. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , JUSTICE M ANUAL § 9-110.200 (2016) (“[T]he
Criminal Division will not approve ‘imaginative’ prosecutions under RICO which
are far afield from the congressional purpose of the RICO statute.”).
269. See Edgar G. Sánchez, Note, Crypto-Currencies: The 21st Century’s
Money Laundering and Tax Havens, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 189 (2017)
(proposing solutions to cryptocurrencies’ use in money laundering and tax
evasion).
270. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 114, at 1–8 (suggesting a peer-to-peer system
to foster trust among Bitcoin users).
271. See supra Part II.C (regarding investors hesitation to invest in
cryptocurrency).
272. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) (“[T]he legislative
history forcefully supports the view that the major purpose of Title IX is to
address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime.”).

